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The application of formal inference procedures, such as Bayes Theorem, requires that a
judgment is made, by which the evidential meaning of physical observations is stated within
the context of a formal model. Uncertain evidence is deﬁned as the class of observations
for which this statement cannot take place in certain terms. It is a signiﬁcant class of evidence,
since it cannot be treated using Bayes Theorem in its conventional form [G. Shafer, A Math-
ematical Theory of Evidence, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1976].
In this paper, we present an extension of the Bayesian theory that can be used to perform
probabilistic inference with uncertain evidence. The extension is based on an idealized view of
inference in which observations are used to rule out possible valuations of the variables in a
modeling space.
The extension is diﬀerent from earlier probabilistic approaches such as Jeﬀreys rule of
probability kinematics and Cheesemans rule of distributed meaning, by introducing two
forms of evidential meaning representation are presented, for which non-probabilistic ana-
logues are found in theories such as Evidence Theory and Possibility Theory. By viewing
the statement of evidential meaning as a separate step in the inference process, a clear prob-
abilistic interpretation can be given to these forms of representation, and a generalization of
Bayes Theorem can be derived. This generalized rule of inference allows uncertain evidence to
be incorporated into probabilistic inference procedures.
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The ﬁeld of Bayesian inference is a branch of Probability Theory that employs the
subjectivist interpretation of probability, in which all forms of uncertainty are attrib-
uted to ignorance, and probability is considered to be a measure of belief that is suf-
ﬁcient to treat all problems of uncertainty [1]. Still, it is not the only theory for
reasoning with uncertainty. Alternative theories, such as Fuzzy Logic [2], Possibility
Theory [3] and Evidence Theory [4] have been advocated as theories that should be
used where Probability Theory allegedly fails to apply, particularly in situations
where the evidential meaning of observations cannot be precisely deﬁned.
The suggestion that Probability Theory is incapable of dealing with this class of
observations is motivated by a limitation of Bayes Theorem, which Shafer describes
as: [In the Bayesian Theory], we ﬁnd that the assimilation of new evidence depends
on an astonishing assumption: we must assume that the exact and full eﬀect of that
new evidence is to establish a single proposition with certainty [4].
The requirement of having a statement in certain terms of the observed event orig-
inates from the fact that only in that case will the event be quantiﬁable, i.e. can its
likelihood function be computed. While Bayesian theorists sometimes assert that
in principle any event can be quantiﬁed [5], in practice we face restrictions in the level
of detail that can reasonably be introduced in our (mathematical) models.
For instance, the number of possibilities that an observer has in choosing the
words to describe a given situation to us may be very large. In an attempt to quantify
the observers description, every diﬀerent way of wording would require its own like-
lihood function, i.e. a representation of the extent of our belief that the observer
would pick the particular wording. This entails anticipating, describing, and quanti-
fying all the possibilities [6, p. 45], which is usually not feasible. Even more likely in
practical situations, the model may not be a matter of choice, but rather be forced on
us by standards or convention. This raises the potential for situations where obser-
vations do not appear to ﬁt any of the classiﬁcations provided to us by such models,
which in turn makes it impossible to quantify the likelihood of such observations.
However, the suggestion that Probability Theory is fundamentally limited in deal-
ing with such observations, which will in this paper be referred to as uncertain evi-
dence, is not generally accepted. Jaynes, who describes uncertain evidence as
statements that are too vague to be testable, comments on the absence of a formal
principle by which such information can be used in a mathematical theory. However,
he also states the fact that our intuitive common sense does make use of non-testable
information suggests that new principles for this, as yet undiscovered, must exist [7,
pp. 44–45]. Earlier, Jeﬀrey had presented a probabilistic solution in the form of a rule
of probability kinematics [8], which is commonly referred to as Jeﬀreys Rule. The
rule of probability kinematics extends Bayes Theorem by allowing multiple interpre-
tations of an observation to be made. While Jeﬀreys Rule is sometimes considered to
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dence, e.g. [9], it is suggested that this rule has limited application because it intro-
duces strong assumptions [6]. Cheeseman, in the context of the debate about the
treatment of vagueness, speaks of the uncertainty about intended meaning of lin-
guistic terms, and presents a probabilistic rule for combination of probability distri-
butions in order to allow for such uncertainty [10].
While the latter rule is frequently cited in the debate between Fuzzy Logicians and
Probability Theorists [11], and will be seen to be similar to the rule of inference pro-
posed in this paper, the notion of distributed meaning upon which the rule is based,
is considered to be too restrictive, and too far removed from the way in which human
reasoning takes place, particularly due to the fact that the distributed aspect implies
that the meaning is somehow additive, whereas human reasoning appears to involve
the evaluation of a degree of compatibility between model and observation [12].
On the other hand, the alternative theories proposed to lift these restrictions are
faced with their own set of problems. Most importantly, these theories have been
criticized for a lack of solid conceptual basis, stemming from a poor deﬁnition of
uncertainty measures and the ad hoc nature of their rules of inference, e.g. [13–21].
The purpose of the current work is to provide a more complete discussion of evi-
dence uncertainty, to present a solution to the problem that is derived from a ﬁrm
conceptual basis, which includes treatment of a new type of dependency between
observations that arises due to evidence uncertainty.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents an ideal-
ized view of inference processes, which forms the background for later discussions.
Within the context of this idealized view, Section 3 deﬁnes and discusses the concept
of uncertain evidence, and illustrates some of its causes. Section 4 starts the presen-
tation of a probabilistic solution to the treatment of uncertain evidence by discussing
two schemes for the formal representation of uncertain evidence. Section 5 then de-
scribes a generalization of Bayes Theorem that can be used to perform inference with
uncertain evidence, along with some alternative formulations, as well as an impor-
tant mathematical property. Some of the properties of the rule are described in Sec-
tion 6. Finally, a brief comparison with alternative theories is made in Section 7.2. Idealized view of inference
The discussion of Evidence Uncertainty in this paper relies on a view of formal-
ized reasoning that is outlined in this section. In addition to introducing the ideas,
the section will also establish the terminology used in the remainder of the paper.
2.1. Process of inference
Inference is broadly deﬁned as the process of concluding or deciding from some-
thing known or assumed [22]. Alternatively, it can be described as learning why the
things around us happen the way they do, and using the knowledge that we gained
by doing so to assess how things were or once will be. In this paper, we will focus
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of the reality around us by having experiences, and using the knowledge gained from
the experiences to improve our understanding of the observed reality as a whole. For
instance, we may be concerned with learning about the failure rate of a particular
product based on for instance the observation of product life tests. These observa-
tions form speciﬁc experiences that help us to assess the reliability of similar products.
Our idealized view of inference rests on three key notions, namely reality, experi-
ence, and understanding. Reality consists of the physical, detailed world around us,
and is the thing that we reason about. Here, we consider that such a reality exists,
and that all phenomena that occur within it obey certain principles of regularity.
Reality can never be entirely known to us. We only receive indications of the state
and behavior of reality in the form of experiences. These experiences may take the
form of direct observations of reality that we make ourselves, for instances by seeing
or feeling, but may also consist of reﬂections of the state of reality reported to us by
human witnesses or instruments. Such experiences only reveal aspects rather than the
whole of reality to us.
Experience is ordinarily thought of as providing a bridge between our mind and
reality [31]. It is in our mind that we build an understanding of what reality is and
how it behaves, supported by the experiences that we have. For instance, our under-
standing of reality allows us to think of objects that we observe as being round or
square, and associate these shapes with an ability to be moved around.
Within the context of scientiﬁc research, this process of building understanding
can be described as identifying aspects of reality, whose combined patterns of behav-
ior can be described in an organized manner, taking the form of some kind of model
or representation. But even in the less formal context of day-to-day reasoning, we
build an understanding of reality by learning how to relate the various experiences
that we have.
2.2. Understanding of reality
While this paper is primarily concerned with the manner in which experiences af-
fect our understanding of reality, this section will present the view of understanding
of reality on which the discussion will be based.
As stated by Bunge [24], the conceptual conquest of reality starts, paradoxically
enough, by idealizing it. In other words, in building an understanding of reality or
some portion of reality, we do not directly handle or interact with reality, but we cre-
ate idealizations that are limited to some aspects of a part of reality. Our understand-
ing of reality takes diﬀerent forms through images, symbols, and other conventions
that the mind uses to encode and represent the knowledge.
Within the context of the proposed theory, like in most if not all theories of formal
inference, the idealizations take the form of mathematical models, which allow us to
characterize reality by describing certain aspects of it, for example shape, color, tem-
perature, time. These aspects are represented by the variables in the model. The char-
acterization of a speciﬁc situation then takes place by assigning values to the
variables. For instance we could say that the shape of an object is square, its color
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the various aspects of a given situation relate to each other, or within the context of
the mathematical description, how the values of the variables depend on each other.
Examples of such rules are the laws of physics, that describe for instance how the tem-
perature, volume, and pressure of a given amount of gas depend on each other.
The above description of modeling a given situation in which we are interested
involves two distinct levels of characterization of that situation. First, we must rec-
ognize that the situation is of a given type, which in turn allows us to select an appro-
priate model to describe the situation. In this paper, we will assume that this type of
characterization of a situation is possible; we will not be concerned with the selection
of a model, nor with the extensions of given models or discovery of new models for
situations that we dont recognize as belonging to a known type.
Each combination of values assigned to a models variables forms a unique pos-
sible representation of the situation. Therefore, many diﬀerent representations of the
situation are possible within the context of a given model. The second level of char-
acterization of a situation consists of selecting the true representation of the situa-
tion, from the set of all representations that are possible within the context of the
given model. We recognize however that this true representation may not be known
to us, in which case there exists a state of uncertainty, which, as we will see later in
this section, we choose to represent by distributing over the set of all possible repre-
sentations a given mass of belief.
In summary, the view of an understanding of reality adopted in this paper consists
of a mathematical model, made of variables, sets of values that can be assigned to
each variable, and rules relating the values of the various variables to each other,
as well as a state of uncertainty that describes the extent to which each of the repre-
sentations possible within the model is believed to be the true representation of the
situation. Inference then is viewed as the process by which this state of uncertainty
alters upon having new experiences of the situation.
2.3. Space of representation
The earlier discussion introduced the notion of the set of representations possible
within the context of a given model. In the remainder of this paper, this set will be
referred to as the space of representation, denoted by the symbolR. The deﬁnition of
R depends on the chosen model, and more speciﬁcally the variables and values de-
ﬁned by that model. Speciﬁcally, let a given situation be represented in the form of a
set of variables X, . . . , Z. Then, R consists of the product space
R ¼ X      Z ð1Þ
Furthermore, let X be the set of possible values of the variables X
X ¼ fx1; . . . ; xng ð2Þ
and let sets of values similarly be available for all other variables in the model, then
each n-plex
r ¼ hx; . . . ; zi ð3Þ
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assertions that are made about reality. The set of representations contained in R is
considered to be both mutually exclusive and exhaustive.
For instance, let a model describe an object in terms of two variables X and Y,
representing the color and shape of the object respectively. Let
X ¼ f‘dark’; ‘light’g
Y ¼ f‘square’; ‘round’g
Then r = hdark, squarei asserts that the object has both a square shape and a dark
color. This set of assertions is thought of as the meaning of the particular represen-
tation. Similarly, the assertions corresponding to a value of a single variables is
thought of as the meaning of that value.
2.4. Concepts of truth and uncertainty
Given the deﬁnition of a space of representation R as the exhaustive set of mutu-
ally exclusive representations possible within the context of a given model, we deﬁne
the primary objective of the inference procedures discussed in this paper as identify-
ing the true representation r^ of a given situation. Truth here is given a pragmatic
interpretation. It is considered to be a personal sense of correspondence between
statement r^ and the reality it represents, which is determined by considering whether
it would be most eﬀective to label a statement as true or false [23]. Under this ac-
count, the truth of statements such as the object is dark can be asserted, despite
the fact that such statements do not necessarily have a concrete and testable mean-
ing, and may involve gross simpliﬁcations of complex physical phenomena. Truth is
therefore considered to be a personal declaration of a correspondence between what
is known about reality and what the statement is believed to imply, rather than an
absolute claim with respect to reality.
Uncertainty then is a state in which the belief in the correspondence between
statement and reality is not absolute, i.e., when we cannot assert with certainty which
of the representations r 2 R is the true representation of a situation.
Two causes of uncertainty are considered. The ﬁrst of these causes, commonly ci-
ted in discussions of the subjective interpretation of probability, is a lack of knowl-
edge about reality, an insuﬃcient ability to observe the state reality as it is or was, or
to foresee what it will be in the future.
A second cause of uncertainty is a lack of knowledge about the meaning of the
possible representations. In general, we say that R is insuﬃciently deﬁned, when gi-
ven inﬁnite time and means to observe reality, one would still not be able to make a
decision regarding the appropriate representation of that reality within R. For in-
stance, when pressed to distinguish between dark and light, or square and round,
as the appropriate characterization of a given object, we may ﬁnd that the distinction
between these terms is sometimes is insuﬃciently clear to make a decision on the
characterization, thus leading to uncertainty.
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round or rather dark are not allowed. Similarly, most models in the ﬁeld of relia-
bility engineering force us to think of component state in terms of failed and not
failed, or available and not available. A clear deﬁnition of these terms is often
lacking, making it hard to decide on the proper representation, even when abundant
information about the condition of the component is available.
Theories such asFuzzyLogic [2] attempt to account for this source of uncertainty by
introducing the concept of graded membership, as discussed in detail in for instance
[25]. In contrast, in this paper we stay with the conventional notions of logic, and as-
sume the representations r in a space of representation R can be considered mutually
exclusive.
The two causes, which do not exclude each other from being present in a given
problem, correspond to the notions of cognitive imprecision and uncertainty about
underlying conditions, that were presented in [26] as two types of ‘‘higher order
uncertainty’’. Both are considered to be a matter of ignorance, i.e., ultimately the re-
sult of a lack of knowledge, and can in principle be addressed by increasing the
amount of knowledge. For instance, the distinction between dark and light colors
in a model may be clariﬁed, even though not necessarily ultimately resolved, if we
receive examples of what are considered to be dark and light colors. Similarly, by
being able to personally inspect a particular object, in contrast to having the object
described to us, we may be better able to decide on what the objects color is.
In order to be able to formally represent such indeterminacy, we resort to probabil-
ity as a measure of uncertainty, relying on its subjective interpretation such as the one
described in [27]: probability is interpreted as a degree of belief measured on a scale
ranging from 0 to 1, which not only obeys an ordering relationship, but whose deﬁni-
tion also provides a physical meaning for the addition of probabilities, and thereby a
justiﬁcation for the resulting calculus of belief, i.e., the calculus of Probability Theory.
A probability distribution p(r), r 2 R, is therefore used to answer the question
how strongly we believe that among all the representations contained in R, r is
the true representation of a given situation. This p(r) applies under the assumption
that the representations in R are mutually exclusive and exhaustive, and that there-
fore R does in fact contain the true representation r^. Probability Theory provides us
with the mathematical rules by which p(r) can be used to obtain probability distri-
butions p(x), representing the state of uncertainty about the aspect of reality corre-
sponding to variable X, as represented by r.
Probability distributions p(r) are considered to be subjective, and therefore sub-
ject to change as our knowledge of the situation changes. The form of inference that
prescribes how a given probability distribution ought to change as new evidence be-
comes available will be the topic of the remainder of this paper.3. Evidence uncertainty
Given the context provided in the previous section, it is now better possible to de-
ﬁne what is meant by uncertain evidence. Our deﬁnition relies on a clear distinction
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physical act of receiving information about a situation. In order for it to be useful
however, it must be translated into the language used by us to describe reality,
which is the space of representation. The result of the translation will be referred
to as the interpretation of the observation.
An interpretation is a statement regarding the evidential meaning of the observa-
tion, in terms of the variables and values provided to us by the space of representa-
tion. It is the result of an act of judgment, by which we decide what can be concluded
from whatever was observed, within the context of the model used to reason about
the situation.
The judgment is required in order to connect the physical reality with its idealized
representation in the form of a model. This idea is illustrated in Fig. 1, which shows
how, based on an observation, a statement is made regarding the value of some var-
iable X.
For example, let variable X represent the type of a physical object that we observe,
with the possible types being deﬁned as dark squares, dark circles, light squares, and
light circles. This deﬁnition provides us with a context within which the type of the
actual object must be considered, and based on the observation, it may be possible to
assert the true type of the object, i.e., the true value of X.
It is however unreasonable to assume that the single true value of a variable such
as X can always be identiﬁed. For instance, an observation that consists of us touch-
ing the object without being able to see it could provide us with the knowledge that
the object is square, while remaining in the dark regarding its color. Translating this
experience into the modeling space, we could say that the true type of the object is
either dark square or light square. Alternatively, we could say that both dark
square and light square are consistent with what we observe, whereas the other
types of objects are not. The true value of X must therefore be one of these two val-
ues. Statements of this type represent a mapping from the physical experience to the
modeling world.
Within the context of a variable X and its domain X, we see therefore that inter-
preting an observation is a matter of distinguishing between the values x 2 X that
based on the observation we know to be impossible, from those that, given the obser-Observation
Representation
Interpretation
X
Θ
π(x|θ)
Reality
Fig. 1. The interpretation of an observation explained as a mapping from reality to formal representation.
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observation leads us to believe that one or more values of a variable are not possible,
those values are contradicted by the observation. It is then claimed that the process
of interpreting an observation fundamentally consists of distinguishing between val-
ues that are contradicted by the observation, and those that are not.
Formally, an interpretation I of an observation O is therefore deﬁned as the union
of those values of a variable X that are consistent with, i.e., not contradicted by,
observation O:
I ¼
[
x; x 2 X and x not contradicted by O
An interpretation I of this type forms the representation of the observed event. Any
value x 2 X that is contradicted by the observation, and therefore is not part of I,
cannot be the true value of X. Further, the true value of X cannot be contradicted
by the observation, and therefore must be part of I. An interpretation I includes
at least one value x 2 X, since an empty interpretation would indicate that every
value of X, and thereby every representation in the space of representation R, is con-
tradicted by the observation. This is in conﬂict with the assumption that exactly one
representation in R is the true representation of the situation.
While interpretations of this type do not necessarily point to a unique value as the
true value of X, they are still considered to be certain events: they specify in certain
terms the set of values that are consistent with the observation, and therefore the set
wherein the true value of X is believed to be contained. Consequently, interval data,
or more generally grouped continuous data [28], is considered to fall within the cat-
egory of certain events, as long as the bounds of the intervals are exactly known. The
likelihood function corresponding to an interpretation I is then deﬁned as the prob-
ability that the true value of X is among the values contained in I, and is obtained by
summing or integrating the probabilities of all values x included in I.
A problem arises however in case there exist one or more values x 2 X for which it
is not certain whether they are contradicted by the observation or not, i.e. whether
they should be included in I or not. To illustrate this point, consider the example of a
continuous scale of darkness, used to represent the color of an object. If the real ob-
ject is described to us as very dark, we will likely run into a situation where we are
unable to decide on a certain value, or even a certain range of values to describe the
objects degree of darkness, see Fig. 2. This particular example is a case of vagueness
due to lingual imprecision, much discussed within the context of Fuzzy Logic, e.g.,
[2,25]. But even if we were able to directly see the object, yet had no instrument to
measure its degree of darkness, assuming that an objective measure of darkness ex-
ists, we could be equally unable to decide on a certain value or interval of values.
These examples are both instances of what will be referred to as uncertain evi-
dence, which is deﬁned as the class of evidence that can not be given a certain mean-
ing within the context of a given model, i.e., the meaning of which cannot be
described in the form of a union of representations.
The most obvious cause of evidence uncertainty is a lack of detail in the informa-
tion obtained by us through the observation. The level of detail at which the space of
Observation
Representation
Uncertain
Interpretation
X
Fig. 2. Uncertain interpretation of observation that the object is dark.
58 F.J. Groen, A. Mosleh / Internat. J. Approx. Reason. 39 (2005) 49–83representation is deﬁned entails requirements in terms of the amount of detail needed
in an observation. If the required level of detail is not matched by the observation,
we may be unable to decide whether certain values of the observable attribute should
be ruled out or not. We can then say that the observation is insuﬃciently speciﬁc
about the true state of reality.
Such a mismatch may be the result of a limitation in our own observational capa-
bilities. For instance, we could observe a coin-toss from a distance of ten feet, and
barely be able to make out whether head or tail landed up. Or we may try to estimate
the number of people in a crowded classroom. We may not be able to count the num-
ber exactly, yet have a rough guess as to what the number is.
Alternatively, observations may be insuﬃciently speciﬁc when they consist of
some sort of description provided to us by a human witness. When dealing with such
statements, we need to consider its credibility, i.e. whether the statement is an objec-
tive description of the state of reality. We should however also be concerned with
what exactly the statement implies.
Here, we are primarily concerned with the latter. It relates directly to an impor-
tant topic in the ﬁeld of uncertainty, namely reasoning with vagueness and ambigu-
ity. These are two distinct properties of statements that may arise whenever we try to
interpret them. A statement is vague when there is no clear distinction between states
that are possible and states that are not [29]. A statement is ambiguous if it has two
or more distinct meanings [23], or in other words, when it has competing
interpretations.
The interpretation of statements is inherently uncertain when the statements con-
tain so-called probability or possibility qualiﬁers [3], also referred to as modal qual-
iﬁers [30], such as probably and possibly. These qualiﬁers weaken or strengthen the
assertion contained in the description [30], and indicate uncertainty on the side of the
person that provided the statement.
A second cause of evidence uncertainty consists of an insuﬃciently deﬁned space
of representation. This type of uncertainty was detailed in an earlier section. As an
example, we recall the uncertainty that could arise when we are asked to qualify ob-
jects as being either dark or light, without knowing precisely what qualiﬁes as a
dark or light object. This source of evidence uncertainty typically manifests itself
when we are somehow bound to a particular modeling environment.
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Evidence uncertainty has been deﬁned as an uncertainty regarding the interpreta-
tion of an observation, which in turn is an uncertainty about the contradiction of
representations, in a modeling space, by the observation. This section presents two
methods to represent uncertain interpretations, and demonstrates how the two meth-
ods of representation can be related to each other.
4.1. Probability distribution over a space of interpretation
The ﬁrst method of representation requires the introduction of the notion of a
space of interpretation. A space of interpretation I is deﬁned as the space of all pos-
sible interpretations of an observation, given domain X of the observable variable. It
therefore contains all possible certain statements that can be made about the obser-
vation, within the context of a given model.
Consider the earlier example in which four possible types of objects are recog-
nized, each representing a unique combination of color and shape. Within the con-
text of this model, a total of 24  1 = 15 certain statements can be made about the
shape of an object, as shown in Fig. 3. For instance, statement 5 asserts that the true
type of the object resides within the set {light square, dark square}, without intro-
ducing any kind of preference towards either of the two types of objects. Further-
more, the statement asserts that there is no grounds for dismissing either light or
dark squares as a possible type of the object. Statement 5 is therefore the correct
statement to make in case we ﬁnd out that the object is a square, while remaining
in the dark regarding its color. This in contrast to statements 1 or 2, which respec-
tively dismiss dark and light squares, or statements such as 13, which does not dis-
miss light circle as a possible type of the object.
Within our theory, each statement corresponds to a possible interpretation I. The
collective set of interpretations is referred to as the space of interpretation I. It is
constructed by taking all possible non-empty combinations of values of X. In case
of a discrete domain
X ¼ fx1; . . . ; xng ð4Þ
the corresponding space of interpretation will therefore consist of 2n  1 diﬀerent
interpretations
I ¼ fI1; . . . ; I2n1g ð5Þ{
{
{
{
}
}
}
}
{
{
{
{
}
}
}
}
{
{
{
{
}
}
}
}
{
{
}
}
{ }15
14
13
11
10
9
12
7
6
5
8
3
2
1
4
Fig. 3. 15 possible statements with respect to object shape in the simple world example.
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I1 ¼ x1
I2 ¼ x2
I3 ¼ x1 [ x2
  
I2n1 ¼ x1 [    [ xn ð6Þ
In case of a continuous domain, the number of distinct interpretations is inﬁnite, and
their enumeration is therefore not possible. Suﬃce it to say that the construction of a
space of interpretation in that case is fundamentally the same, i.e., a combination of
values taken from the observable variables domain. It is therefore not required that
the interpretation is a single, continuous interval in X. Instead, any combination of
point values and intervals forms a valid member of I.
The ﬁrst method of representation speciﬁes the uncertainty about the interpreta-
tion of an observation O by specifying a probability distribution over the space of
interpretation.
Iunc ¼ fpðI ijHÞ; I i 2 Ig ð7Þ
where H represents the prior knowledge, andX
I i2I
pðI ijHÞ ¼ 1 ð8Þ
An observation is considered uncertain evidence when there are more then one inter-
pretation I i 2 I for which p(IijH) > 0.
This form of evidential meaning representation is similar to the basic belief assign-
ment found in Evidence Theory [4]. However, here a probabilistic interpretation is
given to the belief assignment. The probability assigned to an interpretation Ii rep-
resents the degree of belief that Ii is the correct interpretation for observation O,
and thus I = Ii. Note that this probability is conditional on our prior knowledge
H, implying that prior knowledge is required in order to be able to interpret the
observation, and that the probability assignment could change in case our prior
knowledge changes.
As an illustration of this method of representation, consider the example in which
objects can be described using the two labels dark object and light object, leading
to a space of interpretation
I ¼ f‘dark object’; ‘light object’; ‘dark or light object’g
Uncertainty about the interpretation of an observation of the objects color can be
speciﬁed by assigning a probability to each of these three interpretations, according
to the degree of conﬁdence that each of these rightly describes what can be concluded
from the observation. Here, the probability assigned to the interpretation dark or
light object represents the degree of belief that nothing can be concluded from the
observation with respect to the objects color.
The interpretations in a space I are mutually exclusive, and the probabilities as-
signed to those interpretations are not subject to some ordering property based on
F.J. Groen, A. Mosleh / Internat. J. Approx. Reason. 39 (2005) 49–83 61inclusion. This means for instance that the probability of an interpretation such as
dark or light object can be smaller than that of the interpretation dark object. Even
though it is certain that dark or light object includes the true value of X, it is not
necessarily the most likely interpretation of the observation, e.g., when it is certain
that the observed object is dark. The probability of dark or light object would be
0, whereas the probability of dark object would be 1. The correctness of an inter-
pretation as the representation of the evidential meaning of an observation therefore
depends both on the values that it includes, as well as the ones that it doesnt.
Note ﬁnally that the probability distribution deﬁned over a space of interpretation
is subject to change, as is the case for any uncertainty distribution. Such changes may
for instance occur if particular interpretations become more or less likely in light of
related observations, or if we are explicitly informed by another party how the obser-
vation should be interpreted. Such modiﬁcations of uncertain interpretations will be
discussed in another paper [31].
4.2. Interpretation functions
The second method of representation consists of a direct speciﬁcation of the prob-
ability that a value x 2 X is not contradicted by the observation, and therefore in-
cluded in its interpretation. The representation takes the form of a function q(x),
referred to as interpretation function, that is deﬁned as
qðxÞ ¼ Prðx 2 I jHÞ; x 2 X
0 6 qðxÞ 6 1
where x 2 I denotes the event that value x is not contradicted by the observation,
and q(x) the probability, or degree of belief, that this is the case. Consequently,
the probability that the value x is contradicted by the observation is 1  q(x).
The interpretation lets itself best be illustrated as a way of representing the mean-
ing of a vague statement. Consider for instance the statement the object is dark,
where the interpretation of this statement is to be deﬁned using a variable X, which
describes the objects brightness on a numerical, continuous scale. Then, the interpre-
tation function speciﬁes, for each value x 2 X, the degree of belief that x is not con-
tradicted by the observed statement. Interpretation functions therefore describe a
degree of compatibility with an observation, as opposed to a degree of conﬁrmation
of a value x by an observation. In that respect, interpretation functions are similar to
possibility distributions, an uncertainty measure deﬁned by Possibility Theory [3].
Interpretation functions are not probability distributions, and do not necessarily
sum or integrate to 1. For instance, in situations where an observation is completely
uninformative, q(x) = 1 for every value of X. This in contrast to distributed mean-
ings [10], which consist of distributions over X conditional on an observation. Inter-
pretation functions are also diﬀerent from fuzzy likelihood functions [32], which can
be interpreted as describing the probability that a particular observation would be
made. This requires however that all possible observations can be anticipated, de-
scribed, and quantiﬁed, which is generally not possible [6].
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case occurs when for every value of X, q(x) is either 0 (certainly contradicted) or 1
(certainly not contradicted). Uncertain evidence therefore can be recognized when
for the corresponding interpretation function there is at least one value x for which
0 < qðxÞ < 14.3. Transformation of representations
The interpretation of an observation concerns the mapping of that observation, at
face value, into a space of representation. It constitutes the formal representation of
the evidential meaning of the observation, but not the full inference. Both methods
of representation capture this information, suggesting that a set of transformation
rules exists allowing the two types of representation to be mapped into each other.
The rules are found by considering the deﬁnition of the uncertainty measures used
by the two methods of representation. The ﬁrst method of representation is based on
a probability distribution
Iunc ¼ pðI ijHÞ; I i 2 I ð9Þ
over the set of possible interpretations, whereas the second method is based on the
interpretation function q(x), which describes the probability that a value of X is in-
cluded in the interpretation
qðxÞ ¼ Prðx 2 I jHÞ; x 2 X
Noting that each interpretation Ii consists of a set of values x that according to that
interpretation should be included in the interpretation, the transformation from
p(IijH) to q (x) takes place by summing the probabilities of those interpretations Ii
that include x
qðxÞ ¼
X
I i2I
Prðx 2 I jI ¼ I i;HÞ  pðI ijHÞ ð10Þ
¼
X
i:x2Ii
pðI ijHÞ ð11Þ
As an example, consider the situation in which we are told that an object is dark, and
that we try to express the objects brightness on a continuous numerical scale X.
Consider further that the characterization dark is taken to mean below an (un-
known) level of brightness, i.e., translates into an interval for which the upper bound
is uncertain. Then depending on how the characterization dark is believed to trans-
late into our numerical scale, a diﬀerent interpretation of the observation is obtained.
Fig. 4 shows an example of this uncertain interpretation. The upper half of the
ﬁgure shows six possible interpretations, corresponding six possible upper bounds
v1, . . . , v6 on the brightness imposed by the characterization dark. The interpretation
distribution p(IijH), i = 1, . . . , 6, is found by considering how strongly we believe
each value vi, to represent the upper value of X. The corresponding interpretation
function q(x), obtained using Eq. (10), is shown in the lower half of the same ﬁgure.
I1 I2 I3 I4 I5 I6
x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6
0
0
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Fig. 4. Transformation of the distribution over interpretations into an interpretation function.
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tion function q(x) to a corresponding distribution p(IijH) exists [33], under the con-
dition that there is a set of distinct values xi, i = 1, . . . , n, such thatXn
i¼1
qðxiÞP 1 ð12Þ
However, this reverse transformation is not necessarily unique. A many-to-one rela-
tionship therefore exists between probability distributions over I and interpretation
functions. For example, given the domain
X ¼ fx1; x2; x3g ð13Þ
the uncertain interpretation
I1 ¼ fx1g pðI1jHÞ ¼ 0:5
I2 ¼ fx2; x3g pðI2jHÞ ¼ 0:5
ð14Þ
results in the same interpretation function as
I3 ¼ fx1; x2g pðI3jHÞ ¼ 0:5
I4 ¼ fx3g pðI4jHÞ ¼ 0:5
ð15Þ
At least one solution to the reverse transformation problem can always be found, using
a procedure described in [33]. The procedure is not further described here, since it is not
needed for our discussion. Even though the one-to-many relationship between the two
methods indicates that the interpretation function constitutes a more condensed way
to represent uncertain interpretations, the information contained in an interpretation
function is suﬃcient to perform belief revision, as will be shown in Section 5.
4.4. Operations on interpretation functions
The notion of an interpretation function is further deﬁned by considering two
operations deﬁned on interpretation functions, analogous to the rules deﬁned for
possibility functions in [34].
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observations, pertaining to diﬀerent variables X1, . . . , Xn, are merged into a single
interpretation pertaining to the set of variables hX1, . . . , Xni, leading to an interpre-
tation function q(x1, . . . , xn) indicating the probability that the joint occurrence of
values x1, . . . , xn is not contradicted by the combined observations. An example is
the construction of a single interpretation describing the outcome of two consecutive
coin-tosses. In the case where the individual interpretations are independent, this
joint interpretation function can be constructed as
qðx1; . . . ; xnÞ ¼
Yn
i¼0
qðxiÞ ð16Þ
which follows directly from the deﬁnition of the interpretation function. Similarly,
the interpretation functions for multiple observations pertaining to a single variable
Xi, analogous to data fusion [35], can be combined using the same multiplicative
rule, as long as the individual interpretations are independent.
Evidence marginalization is an operation in which a (joint) interpretation pertain-
ing to a set of variables X1, . . . , Xn is transformed into an interpretation over a var-
iable Y
y ¼ f ðx1; . . . ; xnÞ ð17Þ
where f is not necessarily a one-to-one function. A particularly important example of
marginalization is the construction of interpretations pertaining to suﬃcient statis-
tics. For instance, given the joint interpretation q(x1, . . . , xn) regarding the outcome
of n coin-tosses, consider the transformation into an interpretation function q(k),
where k represents the number of tosses with outcome head. Here, f is not a one-
to-one function, since multiple series of outcomes x1, . . . , xn translate into the same
value of k. Another example would be the grouping of dark and light round objects
into round objects.
In the general case, marginalization can be interpreted as a form of reduction of
the level of detail available to describe a situation through the introduction of aggre-
gate events. For instance, the statistic k represents many diﬀerent scenarios in which
the outcome head is observed k times. Given the probability q(x1, . . . , xn) for each
of those scenarios, we now desire to ﬁnd the probability q(k) that the aggregate event
is contradicted. We must recognize however that this allows for situations in which
the aggregate event is partially contradicted, e.g., where x1 and x2, but not xn is
contradicted.
We propose however that a transformation that applies to the general case does
not exist. There appears to be no transformation of the interpretation functions
q(x1), . . . , q(xn) to a function q(y) corresponding to the transformation of Eq. (17)
which causes the rule of inference to be discussed later in this paper to return iden-
tical posterior distributions.
One exception is the case where q(xi) has the same value for all i. In that case, q(y)
should be assigned the same value. Other exceptions may exist, but are a topic of
further investigation.
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Bayes Theorem is a rule of inference prescribing how a given probability distribu-
tion should be changed in light of newly made observations. In this paper, we have
claimed that the applications of Bayes Theorem requires the formal speciﬁcation of
the meaning of an event within the context of a given modeling space. Bayes Theo-
rem is limited because it requires the interpretation to be made with certainty, even
though weve seen that a probabilistic representation of uncertain interpretations is
possible.
This section proposes a rule of inference that is a generalization of Bayes Theo-
rem, but which is capable of handling uncertain interpretations of the kind described
in Section 4. The discussion in this paper is limited to the treatment of single obser-
vations pertaining to a variable in the space of representation. Therefore, this paper
ignores such problems as the fusion [35] of multiple uncertain interpretations per-
taining to a single variable, as well as dependencies between the interpretation of
multiple observations. These subjects will be discussed in a separate paper [31].
5.1. Principle of Bayesian inference
In order to generalize the Bayesian inference framework to allow for uncertain
evidence, we ﬁrst present an unconventional explanation of the principle of Bayesian
inference. The principle by which Bayesian inference takes place is usually explained
in terms of the likelihood of making an observation, e.g. [36,5,1]. An early explana-
tion that falls into this category is that of Laplace [37], who states that each of the
causes to which an observed event may be attributed is indicated with just as much
likelihood as there is probability that the event will take place. This principle is
mathematically captured by Bayes Theorem
pðhjI ;HÞ ¼ PrðI jh;HÞ  pðhjHÞR
h PrðI jh;HÞ  pðhjHÞ
where the variables of interest is denoted as h.
Although this explanation is well-accepted, an alternative explanation is possible.
This explanation describes Bayesian inference as a process of ruling out representa-
tions from a modeling space, in case those representations are believed to be contra-
dicted by whatever is observed, while leaving the relative likelihood of remaining
representations unaltered.
Consider a space of representation R, made up of both the variables that repre-
sent aspects of a situation in which we are interested, as well as the variables repre-
senting aspects of the situation that can be observed. For instance, in engineering
systems risk assessment problems, we are often interested in the rate at which com-
ponents fail, while we can observe the time it takes for components to fail. As a con-
vention, we will use H to denote the variable of interest, while introducing X to
represent observable variables. Then R is the product space
R ¼ X H ð18Þ
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interest. Our initial state of uncertainty about the situation can be represented in
the form of a probability distribution p(x, hjH) deﬁned over R, which can typically
constructed as
pðx; hjHÞ ¼ pðxjh;HÞ  pðhjHÞ
where p(hjH) is the prior distribution over the variable of interest and p(xjh, H) the
likelihood function.
Upon making an observation of the situation, it may become possible to conclude
that certain values of X are contradicted by that observation, whereas others are not.
For example, by observing a single component at a given point during its operation,
it becomes possible to rule out certain values of the variable time of failure of com-
ponent i. Note that, rather than pinpointing a value x of the observable variable X,
we consider here the more general case in which only a distinction is made between
values of X that are contradicted by the observation, and those that are not.
This interpretation of the observation forms the basis for the modiﬁcation of the
state of uncertainty: if we decide that a given value x 0 is contradicted by whatever we
observe, we should infer that any representation hx 0, hi in R cannot be the true rep-
resentation of the observed situation. This is formally achieved by setting the prob-
ability of any such representation to 0.
For now, the discussion is limited to cases where the interpretation is certain, and
thus to situations where representations in R either are or are not contradicted by
the observation. The observation provides no basis for a preference among represen-
tations that are not contradicted. Consequently, the relative likelihoods of the
remaining representations should not be aﬀected by the observation. The updated
probability distribution over R is then arrived at through renormalization of the
prior probabilities of the remaining representations.
The principle is formalized as follows. Given the certain interpretation function
q(x) for an observation O
qðxÞ ¼
0 if x contradicted by O
1 if x not contradicted by O
( )
ð19Þ
The probability of representations contradicted by O is set to 0 by multiplying
p(x, hjH) and q(x). The updated distribution over R is found by normalizing the
resulting product
pðx; hjH ;OÞ ¼ qðxÞ  pðxjh;HÞ  pðhjHÞR R
x;h qðxÞ  pðxjh;HÞ  pðhjHÞ  dx  dh
ð20Þ
As an example, consider the problem in which we are updating our beliefs regarding
the failure rate k of a given type of component based on the information that one
component was tested, and that based on our observation, we conclude that failure
took place between t = 3 and t = 6, such that q(x) = 1 for 36 t 66 and q(x) = 0 else-
where. The time-to-failure distribution p(tjk), which is the model of the components
reliability behavior, follows the exponential distribution
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We construct therefore a space of representation
R ¼ k t
where t is the time at which failure of the observed unit took place. The prior distri-
bution p(k, tjH) is shown in the left-hand plot in Fig. 5. Based on the observation, we
set the probability for every representation in R for which t < 3 or t > 6 to 0. The
resulting density p(k, tjH, O) is shown the right-hand plot in the same in Fig. 5.
The corresponding marginal distributions are shown in Fig. 6.
Typically, we only require the distribution over the unknown h. This distribution
is obtained by marginalizing Eq. (20).
pðhjH ;OÞ ¼
R
x qðxÞ  pðxjh;HÞ  pðhjHÞ  dxR R
x;h qðxÞ  pðxjh;HÞ  pðhjHÞ  dx  dh
ð21Þ
¼
R
x qðxÞ  pðxjh;HÞ  dx  pðhjHÞR R
x;h qðxÞ  pðxjh;HÞ  dx  pðhjHÞ  dh
ð22Þ
In this equation, O represents the event that the true value of X is not contradicted
by the observation, regardless of what this true value is. The probability of O is given
by
PrðOjh;HÞ ¼
Z
x
qðxÞ  pðxjh;HÞ  dx ð23Þ
The term can be equated to the probability of what is referred to as the observed
event. The probability is therefore equivalent to a likelihood function, from which
it is concluded that Eq. (21) is equivalent to Bayes Theorem.
5.2. Generalized rule of inference
In order to derive the mathematical formulation of a rule of inference capable of
treating evidence uncertainty, it is required that the principle of Bayesian inference is0
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Fig. 5. p(k,t) before and after adding the information that 3 < t < 6.
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a process of ruling out possible representations of a situation, in case those represen-
tations are found to be contradicted by an observation, while leaving the likelihood
ratio of remaining representations unaﬀected.
The generalization of this principle removes the latter part of the original princi-
ple. It is replaced by the assumption that in case a representation r = hx, hi in a space
of representation R is less likely to be contradicted by an observation, r is indicated
with a greater likelihood to be the correct representation. More precisely, it is as-
sumed that the likelihood of r, based on an observation alone, is directly propor-
tional related to the probability that r is not contradicted by the observation.
Given that the evidential meaning of an observation does not extend beyond the
statement regarding the variable that is subject of the observation, this likelihood fol-
lows directly from the observations interpretation function q(x).
The generalized principle then states that the impact of the observation on a rep-
resentations likelihood of being is also proportional to the probability that the
representation is not contradicted by the observation. Therefore, given two represen-
tations r1 = hx1, h1i and r2 = hx2, h1i in a space of representation R, the likelihood
ratio
pðx1; h1jÞ
pðx2; h2jÞ
should change by a factor that depends on the probabilities q (x1) and q(x2) that rep-
resentations r1 and r2 are contradicted by the observation. This is in accordance with
Bayesian theory, according to which the overall strength of belief in a hypothesis,
based on both prior knowledge and observed evidence, should be the product of
the prior odds and the likelihood ratio [6]. Here, the prior odds reﬂect the predictive
or prospective support for the hypothesis based on the prior knowledge, whereas the
likelihood ratio represents the retroactive or diagnostic support.
More precisely, the likelihood ratio of representations r1 and r2 is changed by a
factor q(x1)/q(x2), i.e., the ratio of probabilities that the states are not contradicted
by the observation. Formally, this rule of inference is achieved by Eq. (20),Fig. 6. Marginal distributions p(k) and p(t) before and after adding the information that 3 < t < 6.
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x;h qðxÞ  pðxjh;HÞ  pðhjHÞ  dx  dh
ð24Þ
in this case however allowing q(x) to assume any value between 0 and 1. The mar-
ginal distribution over h again is
pðhjH ;OÞ ¼
R
x qðxÞ  pðxjh;HÞ  dx  pðhjHÞR R
x;h qðxÞ  pðxjh;HÞ  pðhjHÞ  dx  dh
ð25Þ
This is a generalization of Bayes Theorem in which the likelihood function is re-
placed by the integral
PrðOjh;HÞ ¼
Z
x
qðxÞ  pðxjh;HÞ  dx ð26Þ
¼
Z
x
Prðx 2 I jHÞ  pðxjh;HÞ  dx ð27Þ
Recall from an earlier section that O was deﬁned as the event that the true value of X
is not contradicted by the observation. The integral equals the probability that what-
ever was expected a priori is not contradicted by the observation. This is a more gen-
eral deﬁnition of a likelihood function than that as the probability of the observed
event.
Example 1. Given a coin-toss problem with unknown variable Q representing the
fraction of coin-tosses resulting in the outcome head, we update our knowledge
about Q using an observation for which we construct the interpretation
x1 ¼ ‘head’; q1 ¼ q
x2 ¼ ‘tail’; q2 ¼ 1 q
ð28Þ
The likelihood function for x1 equals Q; the likelihood function for x2 equals 1  Q.
The prior distribution over Q consists of a Beta distribution with parameters a and b
pðQjHÞ ¼ BeðQja; bÞ ¼ 1
Bða; bÞ  Q
a1  ð1 QÞb1 ð29Þ
A revision of this distribution based on the uncertain observation leads to
pðQjH ;OÞ ¼ ðQ  qþ ð1 QÞ  ð1 qÞÞ  BeðQja; bÞR 1
Q¼0ðQ  qþ ð1 QÞ  ð1 qÞÞ  BeðQja; bÞ  dQ
ð30Þ
Given that
Q  BeðQja; bÞ ¼ a
aþ b  BeðQjaþ 1; bÞ ð31Þ
and
ð1 QÞ  BeðQja; bÞ ¼ b
aþ b  BeðQja; bþ 1Þ ð32Þ
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pðQjH ;OÞ ¼ a  q  BeðQjaþ 1; bÞ þ b  ð1 qÞ  BeðQja; bþ 1Þ
a  qþ b  ð1 qÞ ð33Þ
The formulation in Eq. (26) assumes that the interpretation of the observation is
independent of HPrðx 2 I jHÞ ¼ Prðx 2 I jh;HÞ ð34Þ
This requires that the interpretation of the observation is made independent of the
interpretations of prior observations included in H, which is not necessarily the case.
For example, one can envision situations where one is willing to change the way in
which a given type of observation is interpreted, in case particular interpretations
turn out to be more consistent with expectations or later observations than others
[30]. A straightforward example is the case where we judge statements made by a gi-
ven person based on what he or she has told us in the past. Similarly, dependence
between the interpretation and H arises when we know that multiple observations
should be interpreted the same way, despite being uncertain about the interpretation
of the individual observations. These types of dependencies may be addressed, and
the assumption of independence thereby removed, by parameterizing the interpreta-
tion function, and introducing the parameter governing the interpretation into the
space of representation. This will be the topic of a forthcoming paper [31].
5.3. Alternative formulations
The general rule of inference, Eq. (25), can be given two alternative formulations.
The ﬁrst is obtained using the relationship of Eq. (10)
qðxÞ ¼
X
i:x2Ii
pðI ijHÞ
Making the substitution in the likelihood function, we ﬁndZ
x
qðxÞ  pðxjh;HÞ  dx ¼
Z
x
X
Ii2I
Prðx 2 I jI i;HÞ  pðI ijHÞ  pðxjh;HÞ  dx ð35Þ
¼
X
I i2I
pðI ijHÞ 
Z
x
Prðx 2 I jI i;HÞ  pðxjh;HÞ  dx ð36Þ
Since the termZ
x
Prðx 2 I jI i;HÞ  pðxjh;HÞ
is equivalent to the conventional likelihood function for a certain event described by
interpretation Ii, the generalized likelihood function equals the sum of likelihood
functions for the candidate interpretations Ii, weighted by the probability assigned
to those interpretations. The rule of inference itself can then be written as
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P
Ii2I
R
x Prðx 2 I jI i;HÞ  pðxjh;HÞ  dx  pðhjHÞ  pðI ijHÞP
I i2I
R R
x;h Prðx 2 I jI i;HÞ  pðxjh;HÞ  dx  pðhjHÞ  dh  pðI ijHÞ
ð37Þ
More importantly, the rule of inference itself can be rewritten as a weighted sum of
posterior distributions.A formulation of this type is particularly useful if the prior
distribution and likelihood function for the interpretations form conjugate pairs,
since the posterior distribution can then be computed as the sum of parametric dis-
tributions. Let x 0 2 Ii represent the event that the true value x 0 of X is contained in Ii,
the probability of which is given by
pðx0 2 I ijh;HÞ ¼
Z
x
Prðx 2 I jI i;HÞ  pðxjh;HÞ  dx ð38Þ
Eq. (37) can then be written as
pðhjH ;OÞ ¼
P
Ii2I
pðx0 2 I ijh;HÞ  pðhjHÞ  pðI ijHÞP
Ii2I
R R
x;h pðx0 2 I ijh;HÞ  pðhjHÞ  dh  pðI ijHÞ
ð39Þ
It follows that
pðhjH ;OÞ ¼
P
Ii2I
pðhjx0 2 I i;HÞ  pðx0 2 I ijHÞ  pðI ijHÞP
Ii2I
R R
x;h pðhjx0 2 I i;HÞ  pðx0 2 I ijHÞ  dh  pðI ijHÞ
ð40Þ
Integration of the denominator over H leads to
pðhjH ;OÞ ¼
P
Ii2I
pðhjx0 2 I i;HÞ  pðx0 2 I ijHÞ  pðI ijHÞP
Ii2I
pðx0 2 I ijHÞ  pðI ijHÞ ð41Þ
¼
X
Ii2I
pðhjx0 2 I i;HÞ  pðx
0 2 I ijHÞ  pðI ijHÞP
Ii2I
pðx0 2 I ijHÞ  pðI ijHÞ ð42Þ
This equation represents a weighted sum of posterior distributions
pðhjH ;OÞ ¼
X
Ii2I
pðhjx0 2 I i;HÞ  wi ð43Þ
in which the weight factor wi corresponding to interpretation Ii is given by
wi ¼ pðx
0 2 I ijHÞ  pðI ijHÞP
I i2I
pðx0 2 I ijHÞ  pðI ijHÞ ð44Þ
with
pðx0 2 I ijHÞ ¼
Z Z
x;h
Prðx 2 I jI i;HÞ  pðxjh;HÞ  dx  dh ð45Þ
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Theorem.
Example 2. Given a coin-toss problem with unknown variable Q representing the
fraction of coin-tosses resulting in the outcome head, we update our knowledge
about Q using an observation for which we construct the interpretation
I1 : ‘head’; pðI1jHÞ ¼ q
I2 : ‘tail’; pðI2jHÞ ¼ 1 q
The likelihood function for I1 equals Q; the likelihood function for I2 equals 1  Q.
Given a prior distribution over Q that consists of a Beta distribution with parameters
a and b, we know that
pðQjx0 2 I1;HÞ ¼ BeðQjaþ 1; bÞ ð46Þ
pðQjx0 2 I2;HÞ ¼ BeðQja; bþ 1Þ ð47Þ
Furthermore,
pðx0 2 I1Þ ¼
Z 1
Q¼0
Q  BeðQja; bÞ  dQ ¼ a
aþ b ð48Þ
pðx0 2 I2Þ ¼
Z 1
Q¼0
ð1 QÞ  BeðQja; bÞ  dQ ¼ b
aþ b ð49Þ
The posterior distribution can then be constructed as the sum of posterior
distributions
pðQjOÞ ¼ a  q  BeðQjaþ 1; bÞ þ b  ð1 qÞ  BeðQja; bþ 1Þ
a  qþ b  ð1 qÞ ð50Þ
which is equal to the result obtained in Example 1.6. Properties and implications
6.1. Transformation of continuous parameters
The generalized rule of inference, Eq. (25), applies to both discrete and continuous
variables, with the exception that the discrete case requires that integrals be replaced
by summations. In the continuous case, it can be shown that the rule is insensitive to
transformations of the space of representation R.
Consider the transformation between a space of representation R ¼ H X and
its dual space R0 ¼ U Y using the bijective functions f and g
/ ¼ f ðhÞ ð51Þ
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Direct application of the rule of inference, Eq. (25) to prior distribution p/, y(/,yjH)
and interpretation function qy(y) results in a posterior distribution p/, y(/, yjH, O),
which can subsequently be transformed to the equivalent distribution ph,x(h, xjH, O)
ph;xðh; xjH ;OÞ ¼ p/;yðf ðhÞ; gðxÞjH ;OÞ  d/
dh
 dy
dx
ð53Þ
using the standard rules for transformations of density functions under a change of
variables.
Alternatively, we ﬁrst transform prior distribution p/,y(/, yjH)
ph;xðh; xjHÞ ¼ p/;yðf ðhÞ; gðxÞjHÞ  d/
dh
 dy
dx
ð54Þ
and interpretation function qy(y)
qxðxÞ ¼ qyðgðxÞÞ ð55Þ
The latter transformation follows from the deﬁnition of the interpretation function:
the probability that a given value x is contradicted by an observation is equal to the
probability that the corresponding value y = g(x) is contradicted by that
observation.
Using the transformed prior distribution and interpretation function in Eq. (25),
we ﬁnd
ph;xðh; xjH ;OÞ ¼
p/;yðf ðhÞ; gðxÞjHÞ  d/
dh
 dy
dx
 qyðgðxÞÞR R
h;x p/;yðf ðhÞ; gðxÞjHÞ 
d/
dh
 dy
dx
 qyðgðxÞÞ  dx  dh
ð56Þ
which can be simpliﬁed to
ph;xðh; xjH ;OÞ ¼
p/;yð/; yjHÞ  qyðyÞR R
h;x p/;yð/; yjHÞ  qyðyÞ  dy  d/
 d/
dh
 dy
dx
ð57Þ
¼ p/;yð/; yjH ;OÞ  d/
dh
 dy
dx
ð58Þ
A comparison of Eqs. (53) and (58) shows that the resulting posterior distributions
are identical, which proves that the generalized rule of inference is not sensitive to
changes of variables.
6.2. Certain versus uncertain interpretations
Depending on the choice of parameterization of the space of representation R, a
given observation may or may not present itself as uncertain evidence. This is illus-
trated in the following example, in which both the generalized rule of inference and
Bayes Theorem are applied to a single observation.
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product based on the results of a life test involving n units. The procedure of the test
is as follows. The n units are operated during a time interval of length t1. After this
ﬁrst interval, m units are inspected, none of which are found to be failed. All units are
put back to test for a second time interval of length t2. At the end of the second
interval, a unit is inspected, and found to be failed. It is not known whether the unit
had been tested at the end of the ﬁrst interval or not.
We want to update our prior distribution about k based on the observation of the
failed unit at the end of the second interval. Let X be the observed attribute,
representing the interval during which failure took place. The experimental setup
allows for two interpretations of the observation:
I1 : failure during first or second interval
I2 : survived first interval; failure during second interval
The probability that I1 is the correct interpretation for this particular unit is equal to
the probability that the unit was not inspected after the ﬁrst interval. Thus
P 1 ¼ n mn ð59Þ
P 2 ¼ mn ð60Þ
Assuming an exponential time to failure distribution and using the relation
pðt 2 I ijk;HÞ ¼
Z
t:t2I i
pðtjk;HÞ  pðkjHÞ ð61Þ
where t represents the time of failure, we ﬁnd
pðt 2 I1jk;HÞ ¼ 1 ekðt1þt2Þ ð62Þ
pðt 2 I2jk;HÞ ¼ ekt1  ð1 ekt2Þ ð63Þ
We use the weighted likelihood formulation of the rule of inference to update prior
distribution p(kjH)
pðkjO;HÞ ¼
nm
n  1 ekðt1þt2Þ
 þ mn  ekt1  1 ekt2ð Þ   pðkjHÞR
k
nm
n  1 ekðt1þt2Þð Þ þ mn  ekt1  ð1 ekt2Þ
   pðkjHÞ  dk ð64Þ
Alternatively, the uncertain interpretation can be expressed as
qOðx1Þ ¼
n m
n
ð65Þ
qOðx2Þ ¼ 1 ð66Þ
where x1 is deﬁned as failure during the ﬁrst interval, and x2 as failure during the
second interval. Again using the exponential time to failure distribution
pðx1jk;HÞ ¼ 1 ekt1 ð67Þ
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We write the rule of inference as
pðkjO;HÞ ¼
nm
n  1 ekt1ð Þ þ 1  ekt1  1 ekt2ð Þ
   pðkjHÞR
k
nm
n  1 ekt1ð Þ þ 1  ekt1  1 ekt2ð Þ
   pðkjHÞ  dk ð69Þ
We see that
n m
n
 1 ekt1 þ 1  ekt1  1 ekt2  ð70Þ
¼ n m
n
 1 ekt1 þ n m
n
þ m
n
 
 ekt1  ekðt1þt2Þ ð71Þ
¼ n m
n
 1 ekðt1þt2Þ þ m
n
 ekt1  1 ekt2  ð72Þ
and thus that Eqs. (64) and (69) are equivalent.
The same problem is solved using Bayes Theorem by constructing the likelihood
function in terms of the time at which detection of a failure took place. Stated this
way, the interpretation of the observation is certain. The possible scenarios leading
to the observation of a failure at the end of the second interval plus their
probabilities are listed in Table 1. Summation of the scenario probabilities leads to a
likelihood function
pðt2jk;HÞ ¼ n mn  1 e
kt1 þ ekt1  ð1 ekt2Þ ð73Þ
Bayes Theorem then becomes
pðkjO;HÞ ¼ pðt2jk;HÞ  pðkjHÞR
k pðt2jk;HÞ  pðkjHÞ  dk
ð74Þ
¼
nm
n  1 ekðt1þt2Þ
 þ mn  ekt1  1 ekt2ð Þ   pðkjHÞR
k
nm
n  1 ekðt1þt2Þð Þ þ mn  ekt1  1 ekt2ð Þ
   pðkjHÞ  dk ð75Þ
which is equivalent to Eqs. (64) and (69).
In this example, two diﬀerent spaces of representation were chosen, one leading to
an uncertain interpretation of the observation, the other to a certain interpretation.
As the example illustrates, both spaces of representation allow for the revision of
beliefs regarding k based on the observation, and both lead to the same posteriorTable 1
Scenarios leading to observation of failure at the end of second test interval
Scenario Likelihood
Failure during ﬁrst interval, not inspected n m
n
 ð1 ekt1 Þ
Failure during second interval, not inspected ekt1  n m
n
 ð1 ekt2 Þ
Failure during second interval, inspected ekt1  m
n
 ð1 ekt2 Þ
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produce identical results if the interpretation can be represented both as a certain
interpretation and an uncertain interpretation.7. Comparison with other approaches
The methods for representing uncertain evidence as well as the generalized rule of
inference presented in this paper fall within the category of probabilistic methods for
performing inference with uncertain evidence. In this paper, we have referred to two
more theories that fall into the same category, namely Jeﬀreys rule of probability
kinematics [8] as well as Cheesemans distributed meanings [10]. While these two ap-
proaches, as well as the approach presented in this paper, have been formulated dif-
ferently, they all obey the laws of Probability Theory. Distinctions arise from the
way in which the uncertain meaning of evidence is speciﬁed. This section will discuss
some aspects of these distinctions, and where possible, draw analogies between these
methods and some non-probabilistic approaches.
7.1. Probabilistic approaches
Jeﬀreys rule of probability kinematics considers that the posterior distribution
can be constructed as a weighted sum of posterior distributions
pðhjH ;OÞ ¼
X
x
pðhjH ; xÞ  wwpðxÞ ð76Þ
where p(hjH, x) is the posterior distribution assuming that x was observed
pðhjH ; xÞ ¼ pðxjh;HÞ  pðhjHÞ
pðxjHÞ ð77Þ
and wwp(x) is a weight function that corresponds to the probability that x was actu-
ally observed. In practical terms, we see that this rule constructs the posterior distri-
bution by weighting the posterior distributions obtained using the possible
interpretations of the observation according to the weights assigned to those inter-
pretations. Examples of the application of this rule, which is also referred to as
weighted posterior method, can be found in for instance [38].
Cheesemans theory of distributed meaning constructs posterior distributions
using the probabilistic rule of combination also in use in the theory of Bayesian net-
works, which can be written as
pðhjH ;OÞ ¼
P
x
pðxjOÞ  pðxjh;HÞ  pðhjHÞP
x;h
pðxjOÞ  pðxjh;HÞ  pðhjHÞ ð78Þ
In this formulation, p(xjh,H) is the likelihood function, and p(xjO) is a probability
distribution that captures the uncertain meaning of the observation O. This rule is
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p( Æ ) is uniform, and furthermore that h and O are independent, and thus
pðxjOÞ / pðx; hjOÞ for x 2 X ð79Þ
These two probabilistic inference rules are diﬀerent from each other, and diﬀerent
from the inference rule proposed in this paper. The diﬀerence can however be ex-
plained as a consequence of diﬀerences in the interpretation of the weight factors.
Conversion rules the weight factor assignments can be proposed under which the
three rules become equivalent.
To ﬁnd the conversion rule, we ﬁrst consider that the three probabilistic rules con-
struct the posterior distribution either as a weighted sum of posterior distributions,
pðhjH ;OÞ ¼
X
x
pðhjH ; xÞ  wwpðxÞ ð80Þ
or using a generalization of Bayes Theorem involving a weighted sum of likelihood
functions
pðhjH ;OÞ ¼
P
x
pðxjh;HÞ  wwlðxÞ  pðhjHÞP
x;h
pðxjh;HÞ  wwlðxÞ  pðhjHÞ ð81Þ
Here, wwl serve as generic weight factors such that both Cheesemans rule and the
generalized rule of inference, Eqs. (78) and (25), are captured by the above formula-
tion. Using Bayes Theorem
pðxjh;HÞ ¼ pðhjH ; xÞ  pðxjHÞ
pðhjHÞ ð82Þ
we ﬁnd that can Eq. (81) can be rewritten as
pðhjH ;OÞ ¼
X
x
pðhjH ; xÞ  wwlðxÞ  pðxjHÞP
x
wwlðxÞ  pðxjHÞ ð83Þ
which is equivalent to Eq. (80), under the condition that
wwpðxÞ ¼ wwlðxÞ  pðxjHÞP
x
wwlðxÞ  pðxjHÞ ð84Þ
Here, prior probability p(xjH) is deﬁned as
pðxjHÞ ¼
X
h
pðxjh;HÞ  pðhjHÞ ð85Þ
The rules for conversion between the three inference rules are then shown in Fig. 7.
The ﬁgure shows that weight assignments in weighted posterior and weighted likeli-
hood formulations of the inference rule are systematically related to each other. Spe-
ciﬁcally, the mathematical formulation of Cheesemans rule is a special case of that
of the generalized rule, which requires that the weight assignment over x representing
the uncertain meaning is normalized.
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generalized rule of inference. The diﬀerence can be explained by considering the
interpretation of the weight factors, which would lead to diﬀerent weight assign-
ments for a given observation. This diﬀerence must be understood and taken into
consideration when the meaning of uncertain evidence is speciﬁed. Alternatively,
one must select the appropriate rule of inference, depending on the way the weight
factor was assigned.
We ﬁrst note that the formulation of Jeﬀreys rule implies that wwp(x) must equal
p(xjH, O), i.e., the posterior distribution over the possible events x. Consequently,
applications of Jeﬀreys rule involve the direct speciﬁcation of a posterior probability
distribution, which has also been characterized as a probabilistic constraint [6].
This is in contrast to the method of speciﬁcation proposed in this paper. To illus-
trate the distinction, consider the simple problem in which we recognize four diﬀer-
ent types of objects, i.e., x 2 {dark square light square, dark circle, light circle}.
Assume that we observe an object by touching it, without being able to see its color,
and that we are able to determine that the object is either a light or a dark square.
Since the observation provides no information about the color of the object, it would
be reasonable to say that the weights assigned to these two values should be equal.
However, if our prior state of knowledge tells us that dark squares are much more
common than light squares, it would be equally reasonable to say that it is much
more likely that the particular object is a dark square.
The ﬁrst type ofweight assignment is based on the observation alone, anddisregards
any prior expectations regarding the color of the object. For this type of weight assign-
ment, the generalized rule of inference applies. The second type of weight assignment is
based on information gained from the observation itself, as well as the prior expecta-
tions regarding the object. This weight assignment eﬀectively corresponds to the pos-
terior distribution over x, and therefore requires that Jeﬀreys rule is applied. The two
types of weight assignments are theoretically required to obey Eq. (84).
Numerically, the distinction between the two types of weight assignments can be
quite large. Assume for instance that based on our prior knowledge, the likelihood
ratio of dark and light squares is 99:1. Then the weighted posterior type assignment
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squarejH, O) = 0.01, despite the fact that based on the observation alone, the two
values are considered equally likely. This eﬀect is therefore quite relevant in for in-
stance reliability applications, where high likelihood ratios are routinely observed be-
tween such values as failure and success, the latter typically being far more likely.
It is therefore important that the appropriate rule of inference is selected, depend-
ing on the information used to make the proper inferences based on the observation.
Unfortunately, doing so may not always be as straightforward as in the above exam-
ple. Lacking a clear set of criteria by which to decide on the appropriate description
of the outcome of a particular trial, it may not be as easy to identify to what extent a
particular uncertainty assignment is driven by our expectations. No clear procedure
for making the distinction is available at this time.
Another complication in the practical application of particularly the weighted
posterior type formulations is that the weight factor assignment should theoretically
be based on our expectations regarding x, and thus the prior state of knowledgeH. A
failure to do so may have the consequence that a given prior distribution and a given
body of uncertain evidence may lead to diﬀerent posterior distributions, depending
on the order in which the evidence is analyzed. This practical limitation does not ap-
ply to the generalized rule of inference.
7.2. Non-probabilistic approaches
As discussed in earlier sections, the Probability Kinematics and Distributed
Meanings approaches rely on a speciﬁcation of the uncertain evidential meaning
of an observation in the form of a probability distribution. This is a well-understood
way of specifying uncertainty about a variable, that consists of distributing a given
mass of belief over the possible values of that variable. While this form of represen-
tation is acceptable in many cases, the theory of uncertain evidence provides an alter-
native in the form of an interpretation function q(x), which is deﬁned as the
probability that a given value x is not contradicted by the observation O, or equiv-
alently, that assuming that x is the true value of variable X is consistent with O
qðxÞ ¼ Prðx not contradicted by OjHÞ ð86Þ
¼ Prðx consistent with OjHÞ ð87Þ
This method of representation assumes the existence of a way of interpreting obser-
vations that is fundamentally diﬀerent, in that it considers the possible values of X on
a one-by-one basis, and distributes the total mass of belief between the two options
that a given value x is or is not contradicted by our observation.
This mode of representation is analogous to the possibility measure found in Pos-
sibility Theory [3][39], which is a theory for information analysis that was developed
based on the claim that much of the information upon which we base our decisions is
possibilistic rather than probabilistic in nature. It seeks to address issues related to
the representation of meaning of information expressed as propositions in a natural
language. The translation of such a proposition into a quantitative measure deﬁned
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meaning that we should not consider the likelihood of the possible values of the var-
iable. Rather, the meaning of a proposition is elicited by considering, for each value,
the extent to which the value is compatible with the proposition, or in other words,
the extent to which the value is possible given the interpretation. The extent of pos-
sibility is represented by means of so-called possibility distributions. A possibility
distribution pA(x) is a fuzzy membership function, in which the degree of member-
ship is interpreted as the degree of compatibility of a value x of variable X with a
proposition A. The membership function takes a value between 0 and 1, where 1 sig-
niﬁes full membership, and therefore complete compatibility between a value x and
the proposition, whereas 0 indicates complete incompatibility. Furthermore, despite
its name, the possibility distribution is not subject to a normalizing constraint, allow-
ing for instance to indicate complete compatibility between an observation and all
values of variable X. The possibility measure is therefore described as a measure
of consistency [34].
Instead of being a graded concept of consistency, the probabilistic interpretation
function considers the degree of belief that a particular value x is consistent with
the observation. It can therefore be interpreted as a probabilistic version of the pos-
sibility measure. It does however enjoy some of the properties of the possibility meas-
ure, such as the fact that it is not sensitive to the frame problem [40]. Consider for
instance the distribution of mass between the possible classiﬁcations as dark square
and light square. Without any indication regarding the color of the object, we would
normally equally distribute the probability mass over the two options. However, com-
paring this distribution to the one made in case we distinguish between very light
squares and somewhat light squares, in addition to dark squares, we see that the
probability assigned to dark squares changes solely because we changed the frame
of values. This diﬀerence aﬀects the resulting posterior distribution as well.
As indicated by Fig. 7, consistency of the three probabilistic methods, the conver-
sion from an interpretation function q (x) to a probability distribution p(xjO) con-
sists of a normalization of q(x), a simple rule that obeys the principle of preference
preservation and, in the discrete case, the principle of probability-possibility consist-
ency [41], though not the least commitment principle (maximum uncertainty)
principle.
The concept of a space of interpretation I introduced in this paper corresponds
to a form of evidential meaning representation found in Evidence Theory [4,42],
which was developed based on a non-probabilistic generalization of Bayes Theorem
[43]. Evidence theory refers to individual interpretations as focal elements, and to the
space of interpretationI as the frame of discernment. Within the context of this type
of representation, the task of specifying the meaning of a given observation trans-
lates into selecting the appropriate statement from the set of possible statements.
In the case of uncertain evidence, this selection must take place in uncertain terms.
Both Evidence Theory and the theory of uncertain evidence account for this by
allowing a given mass of belief to be distributed over the possible statements, as op-
posed to over the possible values of the variable. This distinction has been character-
ized by saying that in this type of speciﬁcation the principle of additivity is replaced
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tion is referred to as the basic belief assignment, whereas the theory of uncertain evi-
dence refers to it as a probability distribution over the space of interpretation p
(IijH), I i 2 I, representing the degree of belief that a particular statement rightly de-
scribes the conclusion that can be drawn from the observation.
The analogy between the probabilistic and non-probabilistic representations is
further supported by a rule for transformation from Evidence Theorys basic belief
assignments to possibility measures, e.g., [45], which is the non-probabilistic equiv-
alent of Eq. (10), i.e., the conversion from a probability distribution p(IijH),
I i 2 I, to the corresponding interpretation function q(x).8. Conclusions
Bayesian inference can be explained as a process in which possible representations
of a given situation, organized in the form of a space of representation, are classiﬁed
as possibly true or as necessarily false, based on whether these representations are
found to be in contrast with what we observe. If a given representation is contra-
dicted by what we observe, it cannot be the true representation of the situation,
and its likelihood should be set to zero.
Whether or not a particular representation is contradicted by our observations is
necessarily a matter of judgment, by which a connection is made between the phys-
ical reality and the idealized model of the situation. This judgment is therefore based
on the physical observation as well as our understanding of the model. This leaves
the possibility that for one or more representations it is not certain whether it is con-
tradicted or not, in which case we say that the observation belongs to the class of
uncertain evidence.
As has been recognized in the past, the conventional formulation of Bayes Theo-
rem is not capable of handling uncertain evidence, since the uncertainty about the
observed event prevents us from computing the likelihood of what is observed. As
shown in this paper, this restriction can be overcome however, by altering the deﬁ-
nition of the likelihood function from the probability of the observed event to the
probability of whatever is not contradicted by our observations. The representation
of uncertain evidence is therefore a matter of representing the uncertainty about
(non-)contradiction of representations by the observations.
The methods proposed for the representation of the uncertain meaning of
observations have strong analogies with corresponding methods in Evidence
Theory and Possibility Theory. Unlike these theories however, the present theory
relies on probability as a measure of the degree of belief in the truth of given
representations. It also diﬀers from other probabilistic approaches, including
Cheesemans and Jeﬀreys, by not requiring that the uncertainty about the interpre-
tation of an observation is expressed in a normalized form. Furthermore, it is
diﬀerent from Jeﬀreys rule which requires that the interpretation of an observation
considers both the observation itself as well as prior expectations about the
observation.
82 F.J. Groen, A. Mosleh / Internat. J. Approx. Reason. 39 (2005) 49–83The theory as presented in this paper is applicable to situations where the uncer-
tainty about the interpretation does not depend on the interpretation of observations
contained in the prior knowledge base. An expansion is however possible to account
for situations where dependencies exist between the interpretation of multiple obser-
vations, as well as situations where the state of uncertainty is subject to change
depending on the degree of agreement between interpretation and expectation.References
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